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ABSTRACT
As pandemic wide spread results in locking down vital facilities,
digital contact tracing is deemed as a key for re-opening. However,
current efforts in digital contact tracing, running as mobile apps
on users’ smartphones, fall short in being effective. This paper lays
out the vision and guidelines for the next era of digital contact
tracing, where the contact tracing functionality is moved from
being personal responsibility to be the responsibility of facilities
that users visit daily. A privacy-preserving architecture is proposed,
which can be mandated as a prerequisite for any facility to re-open
during or after the pandemic.
1 INTRODUCTION
Human-basedContact Tracing. For the last few decades, human-
based contact tracing has been vital in stopping the spread of in-
fectious diseases [15]. Once a patient is confirmed positive, a com-
munity health worker talks to the patient to learn about other
people who were in recent contact with the patient to screen them
for the disease symptoms [35]. Such simple human-based process
had significant impact in saving lives by early diagnosing patients
and avoiding further disease spread for tuberculosis (TB) [10],
sexually-transmitted disease [12], Severe Acute Respiratory Syn-
drome (SARS) [21], foot-and-mouth-disease [19], smallpox [26],
Ebola [36], among others.
The Need for Digital Contact Tracing. With a pandemic wide
spread and a worldwide lock down, causing unprecedented eco-
nomic crisis, the main question that politicians, economists, and
physicians are looking for is how and when we can re-open busi-
ness while avoiding more pandemic wide spread. Since contact
tracing is identified as a must for pandemic control [16], the EU
Commission recommends that contact tracing is needed for people
to return to hotels and camping sites [14]. In USA, several states
have made contact tracing a prerequisite for re-opening, including
California [24], Pennsylvania [31], Virginia [37], among others [23].
Unfortunately, human-based contact tracing does not scale up to
pandemic cases, with unknown immunity, high mortality rate, high
reproduction number, and where contacts could be unknown to the
patient, e.g., people met in airports, malls, or restaurants [28].
The Rise of Digital Contact Tracing. Motivated by the limita-
tions of human contact tracing, several governments have partnered
with IT industry to come up with digital contact tracing techniques.
The result is hundreds of mobile contact-tracing apps [25] where
users would need to download the app and enable bluetooth con-
nection and/or GPS location. Then the app uses either one or both
of the following approaches:
• Bluetooth User-to-user Contact Tracing. The user is given a
token ID to use every few hours. Once two users were in contact,
their bluetooth connections will recognize each other ID and
save it in a phone log. If a user is tested positive for a pandemic,
authorities get access to the log and determine the IDs that were
in close contact, and act accordingly.
• GPS Location-based Contact Tracing. Users periodically log
their locations with the running app. Once a user is confirmed
positive, authorities get access to the locations and find the recent
user whereabouts. This information is propagated to all app users.
Then, warningmessages and authority notificationwill take place
for users who were in the same location and time with the patient.
Though both approaches ensure user privacy through using
pseudonym IDs [11], the bluetooth approach ensures more privacy
by not reporting user locations. Meanwhile, the bluetooth approach
may miss some of the contacts of people who were in the same
place with a confirmed patient, but only few minutes apart. On the
other side, the GPS approach may end up reporting false positives
in terms of higher number of potential cases that are not in risk. Yet,
the GPS approach helps in identifying risky locations with higher
virus spread.
Our Vision. In Section 2, we make the case that app-based con-
tact tracing does not work. Hence, in Section 3, we lay out our vision
and guidelines for the next era of digital contact tracing. We believe
that contact tracing should not be made as user responsibility and
should not be running on user phones. Instead, contact tracing
should be the responsibility of facilities and business entities (e.g.,
work places, malls, stadiums, restaurants, subways, etc) where the
ability to do contact tracing can be made as a prerequisite for these
facilities to re-open. In Section 4, we outline the architecture that
can realize our vision in a privacy-preserving way.
2 CONTACT TRACING APPS: IT DOES NOT
WORK
Unfortunately, even though there are tremendous efforts put in
developing app-based contact tracing, it did not deliver what it has
promised, mainly for the following two reasons:
(1) Need for large cooperating population. One of the very first
apps, TraceTogether from Singapore [33], has only reached around
1.4M users (25% of population) after more than two months of
release. This means that the probability that two random people in
contact have both installed the app is only 6.25%(0.25*0.25). This
is assuming the best case scenario in which all users who have
the app running in the background. With this tiny ratio, there
is not much real benefit of such apps [32]. Meanwhile, though
Iceland is reported to be the country with the highest population
ratio using a contact tracing app (38%), that did not help much [7].
(2) Low and biased smart phone penetration. Smart phone penetration
varies across countries, e.g., 24% in India, 81% in USA and 95% in S.
Korea [29]. This leaves amajor part of the populationwithout access
to app-based contact tracing [13]. More importantly, smart phone
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penetration is inversely biased with COVID-19 spread. More poor
areas has higher COVID-19 ratio [6] and much less smartphone
penetration, hence less access to contact-tracing apps.
So, unless contact tracing apps are made mandatory and used by
the very large majority of population, they will not be effective [17,
34]. With such serious issues, it becomes apparent that current
efforts in digital contact tracing fail to meet the expectations. As a
result, thoughts are going back to use human-based contact tracing,
especially in USA, where it is estimated that 300,000 human contact
tracers are needed for COVID-19 [2, 9].
3 NEXT ERA OF CONTACT TRACING:
GUIDELINES
Our vision for the next era of digital contact tracing goes beyond
mobile apps to be along the following guidelines:
• Focus on unknown contacts. Human tracers can efficiently
identify family members, friends, or neighbors, but cannot iden-
tify unknown contacts who the patient have contacted in public
facilities, e.g., malls, restaurants, work places. This should be the
main focus of digital contact tracing.
• Focus on indoor environments. People spend most of their
time indoors, where it is more likely to get infected [8]. In USA, a
national survey shows that people spend 87% of their time indoor
and 5% in a vehicle [20]. Digital contact tracing should put more
focus on indoor facilities.
• Contact tracing is not a personal responsibility; it is
surveillance. People should not download any apps. Instead,
each facility should be responsible on its own contact tracing for
its visitors. If someone is tested positive, authorities will contact
recently visited facilities and get their log of the patient contacts.
The ability to do contact tracing would be a prerequisite for any
facility to re-open. This is similar in principal that facilities will
not re-open unless they comply with new hygiene guidelines.
This also goes inline with the requirement that facilities should
have enough CCTV camera coverage to ensure safe operations,
where authorities will get access to, when accidents happen.
• Context-Aware tracing. Digital contact tracing needs to go
beyond the idea of one size fits all (same app running for everyone
everywhere) to the more general case of context-awareness in
terms of both infrastructure and analysis. For infrastructure, each
facility may decide on its own way of deploying contact tracing
technology. Meanwhile, the analysis of whether two persons
were in contact would depend on the facility type.
• Privacy-preserving. Ensuring healthy environment should not
be traded with privacy. Contact tracing should ensure that facili-
ties do not have access to any user private information.
4 THE VISION FOR THE NEXT ERA OF
CONTACT TRACING
Figure 1 gives the system architecture of our vision for the next
era of digital contact tracing. Each facility will decide on deploying
one or both of the two approaches described in Section 1, which we
refer to as User-to-User and Location-based Contact Tracing. Then,
each facility will have its own built-in infrastructure (Section 4.1),
privacy-preserving registration process (Section 4.2), and stored
Figure 1: SystemArchitecture. Facility 1 deploysuser-to-user
contact tracing, Facility N deploys location-based contact
tracing. More facilities can be added independently.
data structure (Section 4.3), which may be different based on the
underlying infrastructure.
Once a person is identified positive with a pandemic, a contact
tracing procedure is triggered at a government-owned server to
identify the set of recently visited facilities (Section 4.4). For each
of these facilities, the server issues an API call that will trigger
the facility query processing module to return a set of candidate
contacts. An additional (optional) context-aware contact tracing
analysis module (Section 4.5) can be applied on the server side to
get more accurate contact tracing information.
4.1 Infrastructure
The underlying infrastructure would be significantly different for
User-to-User and Location-based contact tracing as follows:
User-to-User Contact Tracing. Upon entering a facility, visitors
will be given a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) gateway in the form
of a detached device, wristband, or key chain, that will be handed
back before leaving. Examples of such devices are here [3]. Each of
these devices continuously broadcasts its own ID while reading the
IDs of nearby devices. The reading log stored at each device would
have the form (BLE_ID, timestamp, signal_strength) which presents
the ID of the nearby device, along with the time and signal strength
of reading that device. The latter is used as an indication of how
close is the nearby device.
Location-based Contact Tracing. Upon entering a facility, visi-
tors will be given a small Beacons device that would be returned be-
fore leaving. Examples of such devices are here [4]. Unlike the BLE
gateway devices in user-to-user contact tracing, Beacons devices:
(a) have much smaller size, and (b) only broadcast their own IDs,
but do not read any signal. Meanwhile, the facility will have several
gateway readers fixed on the walls or ceiling that read broadcasted
data from the Beacon devices in the form of (BLE_ID, timestamp,
signal_strength). Examples of such gateways are here [5].
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4.2 Privacy-Preserving Registration Process
The privacy-preserving registration process is the same for both
user-to-user and location-based contact tracing. A facility visitor will
need to sign-in upon entry using a government-owned machine
by entering her phone number or government ID. The machine
will immediately generate a unique random ID that is given to the
facility in exchange of the BLE or Beacon device. The random ID
will be sent either as SMS to the visitor phone to ensure it is an
actual number or as SMS to the machine itself in case the visitor has
provided government ID instead of phone number. This means that
the facility knows nothing about the visitor personal data. To the
facility, the visitor is just a government-generated unique random
ID. Furthermore, government and facilities will completely wipe
any data is more than two weeks old.
Frequent visitors to a facility, e.g., employees at a work place,
frequent airport travelers, or loyal store customers, may need to
do the sign up process only once, where their phone numbers will
be linked with their employee IDs or loyalty numbers. Then, the
BLE or Beacon devices can be given to them once and actually
attached to their work IDs or loyalty cards that they have to scan
upon entering the facility.
4.3 Stored Data Infrastructure
The data structure stored on the government-owned server is in-
dependent from the underlying infrastructure of each facility. It is
basically one big table with the schema (PhoneID, FacilityID, Visi-
torID, timestamp), which indicates that a user with a certain phone
or ID number has visited a certain facility ID at a certain time, and
was given a certain visitor ID. For efficient retrieval, the table is
accessed through two hash tables for PhoneID and VisitorID.
Meanwhile, each facility, regardless of the underlying contact
tracing infrastructure, maintains a Master table with the schema
(VisitorID, BLE_ID, time_in, time_out), which indicates that a certain
BLE or Beacon ID was given to a certain visitor within a certain
time frame. The Master table is accessed through two hash tables
for VisitorID and BLE ID. In addition, each facility maintains the
following data structure(s), based on the underlying infrastructure:
User-to-User Contact Tracing. Each facility maintains a Contacts
table: (BLE_ID1, BLE_ID2, timestamp, signal_strength), which logs
the timestamp and signal strength for each pair of BLE devices
that came close to each other. The signal strength is converted to
some universal distance measure (e.g., meters) to accommodate that
different devices may present signal strength differently. The table
is populated by combining all readings received from individual
BLE devices, and is accessed through a hash table over BLE_ID1.
Location-based Contact Tracing. Each facility maintains a Lo-
cations table with the schema (BLE_ID, location, timestamp), which
logs the locations of each BLE within the facility at a certain times-
tamp. The indoor location is not a traditional <lat,log> coordinates.
Instead, it is more of a symbolic descriptive location based on the
facility map [27]. The Locations table accessed by a hash table over
BLE_ID, and is populated through a typical trilateration process
where the readings from three fixed Gateways for the same BLE
is used to come up with the symbolic BLE location at a certain
time [18]. Such process has been commonly used in indoor posi-
tioning systems for real-time asset tracking [30].
4.4 Contact Tracing Procedure
Once a person is confirmed positive for the pandemic, the contact
tracing procedure is triggered on the server side by government
officials. A simple local query with the patient phone (or ID) and
a certain time period (e.g., last two weeks) would return the set
of facilities F visited by the patient, with the anonymized visitor
ID and timestamp of each visit. A patient may have visited the
same facility multiple times, each with a different visitor ID. For
each facility in F , the server sends an API call inquiry asking for
all visitor IDs who were in contact with the patient visitor ID.
Whenever a facility receives a query with a visitor ID and a
timestamp, it uses its Master table to map the visitor ID to the BLE
ID used during the visit, along with the visit time frame. Then,
based on the underlying infrastructure, the following information
is retrieved and sent back to the server:
User-to-User Contact Tracing. Given a BLE ID and visit time
frame, the facility will use its Contacts table to retrieve all other BLE
IDs that were reported in contact with the visitor BLE ID, along with
the timestamp and estimated distance of each contact event. Then,
a reverse lookup over the Master table will get the corresponding
Visitor ID for each contacted BLE ID. The information sent back
to the requesting authority server will have the schema (VisitorID,
timestamp, estimated_distance).
Location-based Contact Tracing. Given a BLE ID and visit time
frame, the facility will use its Locations table to retrieve the trajec-
tory of locations (with timestamps) within the facility during the
visit. Then, a spatio-temporal indoor range query [22] would re-
trieve all the BLE IDs that were in a close spatio-temporal proximity
to the given BLE ID. The parameters of spatio-temporal proximity
are set in a conservative way, e.g., within 10 meters distance and
10 minutes time frame. Then, a reverse lookup over the Master
table will get the corresponding Visitor ID for each nearby BLE
ID. Finally, the information sent back to the requesting authority
server is: (VisitorID, location, timestamp, spatial proximity, temporal
proximity). In addition, each facility may optionally send the full
spatio-temporal trajectory of the patient visitor within the facility,
which can be used for further analysis at the requesting authority.
4.5 Context-Aware Contact Tracing Analysis
When the government-owned server receives back the results from
each facility, it may just use the list of contacts or nearby visitors
as the ones in risk. In this case, a reverse lookup with the Visitor
ID over the local server table would return the phone number
(or ID) of each visitor. Health officials can take it from there and
start contacting the people accordingly. However, as a means of
increasing the accuracy, additional context-aware contact tracing
analysis can be employed based on the underlying infrastructure:
User-to-User Contact Tracing. The signal strength of each con-
tact may be interpreted differently based on the facility type. For
example, within a stadium, one may focus on the readings with high
signals. Within a restaurant, one may even report lower signals,
only if they were persistent over a certain period of time. Within a
Mall, a different search criteria and parameters can be used.
Location-based Contact Tracing. Assuming the availability of
facility layout, the spatial and temporal proximity of visitors may
be interpreted differently based on the facility type and layout. Two
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contacts who are close by spatially and temporally may have a
wall in between, and hence the proximity is not risky. Meanwhile,
a heatmap may be depicted for the facility indicating regions of
high risk, where contact information may be interpreted differently.
Furthermore, depending on the nature of the pandemic and how it
spreads (e.g., via surface or air), we can find users who have been
to the spots recently visited by a patient. For example, a patient
who uses a table in a food court, leaves it, then another visitor uses
the same table.
Generally speaking, there are many context-aware indoor anal-
ysis that can be deployed [1], though there are way more rich
analysis for the case of location-based contact tracing than user-to-
user contact tracing. Having the context-aware analysis module
on the server side instead of having it on each facility is mainly to
allow health officials to change the parameter settings and search
criteria without the need to get back to the facility. Another alterna-
tive is to have such analysis on the facility side, accessed via more
sophisticated API calls that account for more parameters such as
minimum distance, contact time interval, and location label.
5 CONCLUSION
The paper makes the case that current app-based contact tracing
techniques are not effective. Then, the paper lays out the vision for
the next era of digital contact tracing where the responsibility of
contact tracing is moved from the persons to the facilities that the
persons visit. Each facility, e.g., mall, work place, stadium, train,
restaurant, should have the ability to do contact tracing for all its
visitors. Such ability could be enforced as a prerequisite for any
facility to re-open during a pandemic. A privacy-preserving archi-
tecture and infrastructure that achieve such vision is presented. The
architecture allows each facility to independently decide whether
to deploy a user-to-user or location-based contact tracing approach.
The former approach mainly reports the people in contact to the pa-
tient, while the second approach additionally reports the locations
of the patient and the contacts.
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